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ALL A TWITTER: SOCIAL NETWORKING, COLLEGE
ATHLETES, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Davis Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
Social networking presents new challenges for college athletic programs as
college athletes can more easily divulge information about their personal lives and
opinions, information that can cause distractions to the team and can lead to National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violations and mass suspensions.1 This Note
examines the extent to which college athletes have First Amendment rights,2 and
discusses what avenues are appropriate for colleges and universities to curb the dis-
tractions and suspensions caused by social networking.
Underlying this entire discussion is the private-public dichotomy of college sports.
Private organizations are not subject to the First Amendment because they are not gov-
ernmental entities.3 On the other hand, state universities are government actors and so
are subject to the First Amendment.4
* J.D. candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2012; B.A., College of William & Mary,
2006. To my wife Kristen, thank you for being my sounding board and editor, without your
help this Note would not be where it is today. To my parents, thank you for your support and
guidance, and to my dad, thank you for teaching me at an early age that athletes are still humans.
To my sister Katie, thank you for encouragement throughout this process. Also, thank you to
the staff and editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal. Finally, I must thank Mike
Golic and Mike Greenberg of ESPN Radio’s Mike & Mike in the Morning. The inspiration for
this Note came from their discussions on social media and its influence on sports. Ends up
that listening to sports talk radio did help me in law school.
1 For examples, see discussion infra Part I.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”);
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988) (“The NCAA enjoyed no governmental
powers . . . .”); Brian Lee, Note, Drug Testing and the Confused Athlete: A Look at Differing
Athletic Drug Testing Programs in High School, College, and the Olympics, 3 FLA. COASTAL
L.J. 91, 98 (2001).
4 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“[S]tate colleges and universities are
not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”); see also Doe v. Univ. of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864–65 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 999
(D.N.H. 1976).
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This dichotomy presents a challenge for college athletics. State colleges are subject
to the First Amendment,5 but the governing body for major college athletics, the NCAA,
is not a government actor,6 and therefore is not subject to the First Amendment.7 A
corollary to this dichotomy is that the NCAA can have a requirement, such as drug
testing or restrictions on speech, that its members may not be allowed to enforce.8
College athletic programs are in a difficult position. If a college does not regulate
Twitter, Facebook, and other social networking sites, and a player commits an NCAA
violation using one of those mediums, the NCAA can suspend the player or declare
the player ineligible.9 But if the college chooses an unconstitutional method to reg-
ulate that speech, it can be subjected to lawsuits and constitutional challenges.10 The
goal of this Note is to discuss the different techniques colleges and universities use to
regulate social networking and argue that constitutional methods exist. In particular,
this Note compares the First Amendment implications of a “monitoring” policy,11 like
one implemented by the University of North Carolina (UNC),12 with the implications
of a season-long ban on certain types of social networking, similar to the ban imple-
mented by Boise State University’s (Boise State) Football Coach, Chris Petersen.13
Before discussing these particular policies, Part I of this Note describes the back-
ground from which this issue arose, specifically the “tweeting” of UNC football player
Marvin Austin.14 As part of this background, this Note discusses how social networking
increases the First Amendment complications for public schools and college athletes.
In Part II, this Note discusses whether the type of speech—Internet speech—
or the speaker—a college athlete—is protected by the First Amendment. Part II also
5 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
6 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197 (“The NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers . . . .”);
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020 (4th Cir. 1984) (“The National Collegiate Athletic
Association is a voluntary, unincorporated association of nearly one thousand four-year colleges
and universities.”).
7 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8 See Lee, supra note 3, at 102 (“Although the drugs tested are the same for both the NCAA
and the state university system, the methods must be different for the programs to satisfy con-
stitutional scrutiny.”); see, e.g., Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
9 See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing the UNC players held out
or suspended due to this scandal).
10 See, e.g., Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929.
11 See infra text accompanying note 43.
12 See infra text accompanying note 43.
13 The outright ban that will be analyzed in this Note is Coach Chris Petersen’s verbal
order to his team that players are not to use Twitter during the college football season. See
infra note 35 and accompanying text. To the author’s knowledge there is no written policy
by Boise State, only a verbal order given by Coach Petersen.
14 See discussion infra Part I.
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describes the author’s broad view of the First Amendment and how such a view
supports protecting social networking.
Part III defines the constitutional rights of the college athlete. It starts with the
broad issue of what types of speech colleges and universities can restrict with regard
to all students, and then looks specifically at the substantive constitutional rights of
college athletes. Part III concludes by arguing that student athletes hold substantive
constitutional rights that are protected by the First Amendment. Additionally, Part III
examines whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine15 applies in this case, and
finds that it does apply. The result of applying the doctrine is that strict scrutiny attaches
when the government implements an unconstitutional condition.16
After examining the major background issues, this Note compares and contrasts
the policies of UNC and Boise State. Part IV looks at each policy to see whether the
policies are susceptible to strict scrutiny requirements.17 If they are tested against that
level of scrutiny, they will likely fail constitutional muster.18 To decide whether strict
scrutiny applies, this Note examines whether each restriction is content-neutral19 or
content-based.20 Additionally, Part IV looks at other First Amendment jurisprudence
issues including vagueness and “time, place, and manner restrictions” for each policy.
Ultimately, Part IV concludes that Boise State’s season-long ban is less likely to be
subjected to strict scrutiny and is a better approach for public schools.21
Finally, in Part V, this Note looks at the policy implications of social networking
in the school setting. In the sports world, this problem may be unique to high school
and public college athletic programs, but the constitutional implications of UNC’s22
and Boise State’s23 policies can provide guidance to the greater high school and college
community as social networking becomes more prevalent.24
15 For a definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see infra note 140.
16 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1506
(1989).
17 Strict scrutiny will uphold a law “if it is proved necessary to achieve a compelling gov-
ernment purpose.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 9.1, at 671 (3d ed. 2006) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
18 See infra notes 248–57 and accompanying text.
19 For the definition of content-neutral, see infra note 222.
20 For the definition of content-based, see infra note 221.
21 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
22 See infra text accompanying note 43.
23 See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
24 Some colleges and universities have had a difficult time determining how to handle this
new type of speech for students. For examples, see Greg Lukianoff, The 12 Worst Colleges
for Free Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/greg-lukianoff/the-12-worst-colleges-for_b_814706.html#s230527&title=UMass_Amherst
Amherst_Massachusetts.
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I. BACKGROUND
On May 29, 2010, UNC defensive lineman and top National Football League
(NFL) prospect25 Marvin Austin allegedly “tweeted”26 from a party in Miami.27 The
tweet quickly became known as the “tweet heard ’round the college football world.”28
This capped a spring and summer that included Austin “tweeting” not only about fancy
dinners and parties, but also about his financial problems.29 Following these tweets,
the NCAA and the North Carolina Secretary of State independently commenced in-
vestigations of Austin and his teammates.30 This scandal led to thirteen players being
25 Ultimately, the New York Giants chose Austin in the second round of the 2011 NFL
Draft. See NFL DRAFT TRACKER, http://www.nfl.com/draft/2011/tracker#dt-tabs:dt-by-name
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011). On October 6, 2010, ESPN NFL draft expert Mel Kiper listed
Austin as the twenty-fifth top draft prospect going into the 2011 draft, even though Austin
had not played in the 2010 season. See Mel Kiper, Jr., A.J. Green Belongs on Big Board,
ESPN.COM (Oct. 6, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://insider.espn.go.com/nfl/draft2011/insider/news
/story?id=5654260&action=login&appRedirect=http%3a%2f%2finsider.espn.go.com%2fnfl
%2fdraft2011%2finsider%2fnews%2fstory%3fid%3d5654260=5654260.
26 According to its web page, “Twitter is a real-time information network powered by
people all around the world that lets you share and discover what’s happening now.” About
Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). As a social network-
ing program, Twitter allows users to send “tweets” or messages of up to 140 characters to
the world or “twitterverse” from a variety of media. See id. The “twitterverse” is what the
collective group of Twitter users has become known as in pop culture. See generally Andy
Carvin, Welcome to the Twitterverse, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www
.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101265831; Gavin O’Malley, See the Twitterverse
Through Fresh Eyes, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 27, 2010, 8:05 AM), http://www.mediapost.com
/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=136418. Any user can send a message to
the “twitterverse” from a mobile phone just like a text message. See About Twitter supra.
Twitter has changed drastically how people can communicate, particularly for celebrities of
all types. Now, celebrities need only a mobile phone to reach their fans. Id. This includes the
ability to immediately post to Twitter photos, videos, and links to other websites. Id.
27 It is no longer clear that Austin was at the party when the “tweet” was sent, but instead
it is believed that he was just retweeting a rap lyric. The now infamous tweet mirrors a rap
lyric from the song “Sweet Life” by Rick Ross. See J.P. Giglio, Austin’s Twitter Account
Sheds Light on UNC Player, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 20, 2010, http://www
.newsobserver.com/2010/07/20/v-print/589864/austins-twitter-account-sheds.html; see also,
Doc, Austin’s Twitter Feed Casts Doubt on Club Liv Tweet, TARHEELFANBLOG (July 26,
2010), http://www.tarheelfanblog.com/2010/07/austins-twitter-feed-casts-doubt-on-club-liv
-tweet/. Where the tweet was sent from was not a focus of the investigations.
28 See, e.g., Doc, supra note 27.
29 See, Giglio, supra note 27 (describing the wide variety of tweets sent by Austin including
“pictures of a watch for his younger sister, a bag from an upscale sunglass store in Miami
and a $143 bill from The Cheesecake Factory in Washington, D.C.” and noting that Austin
also tweeted, “Im [sic] so tired of being broke . . . somebody make it rain”).
30 See id. (discussing the NCAA’s investigation); Kelly Naqi, UNC’s Marvin Austin Giving
Testimony, ESPN.com (Sept. 17, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5583074
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suspended or kept from playing in UNC’s first football game of the 2010 season.31
The scandal concluded with Austin being dismissed from the football team, other
players being suspended permanently,32 and later contributed to the firing of UNC
Football Coach Butch Davis.33
UNC is not the only college football program that has dealt with problems arising
from its players’ social networking.34 Boise State Football Coach Chris Petersen banned
his players from using Twitter during the college football season.35 Then–University
of Miami Football Coach Randy Shannon banned his team from using Twitter after
the team’s loss to Ohio State in September 2010, in reaction to the players’ tweeting
in the hours leading up to kickoff of the game.36 Ironically, demonstrating the power
of Twitter, Miami’s athletic department chose to announce the coach’s decision via
a tweet on the department’s Twitter account.37 The bottom line for these coaches
was that Twitter proved a distraction for their players.38
The impact Twitter has had on all levels of sports is significant. In both college
and professional sports, sports stars have taken to Twitter to communicate with their
fan base.39 This progress has proven problematic for some college and professional
(describing Marvin Austin cooperating with the North Carolina Secretary of State’s investigation
that centers around possible violations of the North Carolina Uniform Athlete Agent Act). The
investigations focused on whether professional sports agents had improper contact with Austin,
his teammates, and other college football players, and whether agents paid for those players
to travel and attend parties. See Giglio, supra note 27.
31 See Greg Barnes, No New Players Cleared for Carolina, INSIDECAROLINA.COM
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.wralsportsfan.com/unc/story/8304268/.
32 See Aaron Taube, Marvin Austin Dismissed, Greg Little and Robert Quinn Ruled
Ineligible, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php
/article/2010/10/marvin_austin_dismissed_greg_little_and_robert_quinn_ruled_ineligible.
33 See Ken Tysiac, UNC Fires Football Coach Butch Davis, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 28, 2011, http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/07/27/1373741/unc-trustees-meeting
-on-football.html.
34 See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
35 Brian Murphy, Murphy: Coach Pete Pulls the Plug on Twitter, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Aug. 8, 2010 (on file with author).
36 Manny Navarro & Susan Miller Degnan, Miami Hurricanes Player Ordered to Shut
Down Twitter Accounts, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.gableshomepage.com
/news/2010/09/15/miami-hurricanes-players-ordered-shut-down-twitter-accounts (describing,
for example, that starting quarterback, Jacory Harris, tweeted two hours before kickoff,
“[m]iddle fingers everywhere. This is why you play college football.”).
37 Official Twitter of the University of Miami Athletic Dept., Posting of HurricaneSports,
TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:33 PM), http://twitter.com/#!/hurricanesports/status/24499153399
(“Football program has asked players to shut down Twitter accounts. Goal is to limit dis-
tractions & focus. Bigger goals than TWEETING.”).
38 See, e.g., id.; Murphy, supra note 35 (quoting Boise State Coach Chris Petersen, “It’s
just a distraction that we just don’t really need to have right now. There’s plenty of time in
their lifetime for Twitter.”).
39 See generally, Giglio, supra note 27 (discussing Marvin Austin’s tweets); TWEETING-
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athletes, whose use of social networking has created significant distractions.40 These
numerous incidents led the producers of Mike and Mike in the Morning on ESPN
Radio to parody the popular Carrie Underwood song “Before He Cheats” and replace
the lyrics “maybe next time he’ll think before he cheats” with “maybe next time he’ll
think before he Tweets.”41
A. The Policies Defined
The first approach analyzed by this Note is the idea of a “monitoring policy.”
In September 2010, UNC’s athletic department amended its social networking
policy, which encompasses social networking websites like Twitter, Facebook, and
MySpace.42 According to The News and Observer,
UNC has updated its 2010–11 Student Athlete Handbook to
stipulate that “each team must identify at least one coach or
administrator who is responsible for having access to and regu-
larly monitor the content of team members’ social networking
sites and postings.” The athletics department also reserves the
right to have other staff members monitor athletes’ posts; and if
any of an athlete’s online content violates the law or NCAA,
University or athletic department policies, sanctions could range
from removal of the posting to dismissal from the team.43
ATHLETES.COM, http://www.tweeting-athletes.com/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2011);
Verified MLB Players on Twitter, MLB PRO BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://twitter
.mlblogs.com/ (listing every confirmed Twitter account of a Major League Baseball (MLB)
player).
40 See, e.g., Skiles to Villanueva: No Halftime Tweets, ESPN.com (Mar. 18, 2009, 3:48 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3990853 (detailing how Charlie Villanueva of
the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) Milwaukee Bucks “tweeted” during halftime
of a game he was playing in); Murphy, supra note 35 (describing distractions from Twitter
on the Boise State Football team); Navarro & Degnan, supra note 36 (describing problems
with Twitter on the Miami Hurricane college football team).
41 Mike & Mike in the Morning Telecast (ESPN2 television broadcast July 20, 2011),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALQ6q5Astp8; see also Quinnd, ESPN2’s
Canidate a Mike & Mike “Idol” with Wednesday’s Winning Performance, ESPNMEDIAZONE
(July 20, 2011), http://www.espnmediazone3.com/us/2011/07/20/canidate_radio_idol/ (describ-
ing the parody song).
42 UNC Tweaks Twitter, Facebook Policies, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/30/655873/unc-tweaks-twitter-facebook
-policies.html.
43 Id.
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Officials at UNC denied that the new policy was in reaction to the Austin
investigation.44
The second specific approach this Note examines is Boise State’s season-long
ban on social networking.45 The policy was simple: players were prohibited from
using Twitter until Boise State’s college football season was over.46
The Boise State ban is similar to restrictions placed on Twitter use by profes-
sional sports leagues and teams.47 These leagues and teams have more finite time
limitations but, similar to Boise State, the policies place “time, place, and manner
restrictions”48 on the players’ use of social media. In the NFL, players are banned
from tweeting starting ninety minutes before each game, and tweeting must wait
until the traditional post-game media interviews are over.49 The National Basketball
Association’s (NBA) ban begins forty-five minutes before game time and concludes
once the player finishes his post-game responsibilities.50 Some teams have gone
further, including the Miami Heat of the NBA. The Heat placed a total ban on
tweeting when players are in the team’s complex.51 Tennis’s U.S. Open even banned
players from tweeting about themselves or their opponents, out of fear of violating
gambling laws.52
The ultimate question addressed by this Note is whether the UNC monitoring
policy53 or the season-long ban by Boise State54 represents an unconstitutional restric-
tion on the free speech of college athletes. As discussed prior, this Note takes the po-
sition that Boise State’s season-long ban55 is preferable to UNC’s monitoring policy.56
44 Id.
45 See Murphy, supra note 35 (“[Coach Chris] Petersen has banned his players—nearly
a dozen of them were regulars on Twitter—from interacting on the social media site during
this season.”); supra note 13 and accompanying text. Boise State’s policy will be examined
because it is a public university.
46 Murphy, supra note 35.
47 See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
48 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.4.2.2, at 1131.
49 League Announces Policy on Social Media for Before and After Games, NFL.COM
(Aug. 31, 2009, 6:53 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d8124976d&template
=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.
50 Marc Stein, NBA Social Media Guidelines Out, ESPN.COM (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4520907.
51 Heat Ban Twitter During ‘Office Hours,’ ESPN.COM (Sept. 28, 2009), http://sports
.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4512300.
52 Russell Goldman, New Rules of the Game: Watch What You Tweet, ABCNEWS.COM
(Sept. 1, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=8457223.
53 See supra text accompanying note 43.
54 See supra notes 13 & 35 and accompanying text.
55 Id.
56 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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II. SOCIAL NETWORKING SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first issue this Note examines is how general social networking and other
Internet speech fits into the First Amendment. It is important to determine whether
it matters that this speech comes from a social networking medium rather than a
traditional avenue.
This Note argues that Internet speech should be protected just like traditional
avenues of speech. Internet speech and social networking have the potential to pro-
vide society with a true “marketplace of ideas,”57 and it is this “marketplace” that
warrants First Amendment protection.58 As will be discussed later, Congress and the
courts share this Note’s distrust of overregulation of the Internet and the potential
curbing of Internet speech.59
A. The “Robust, Egalitarian First Amendment”
Scholars argue that Internet speech provides an avenue for more people to be
part of the public discourse.60 Professor Neil Netanel wrote that Professor Jerome
Barron, in his well-known 1967 law review article Access To The Press—A New First
Amendment Right,61 called for a “robust, egalitarian First Amendment.”62 In Professor
Barron’s opinion, this was a view of the First Amendment that was not possible in 1967
because the mass media controlled the avenues of public discourse.63 Today, because
of Internet speech, the public can bypass the mass media and Professor Barron’s view
of the First Amendment is possible.64
In his 1967 article, Professor Barron wrote, “if ever there were a self-operating
marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to exist.”65 But the Internet may make that
marketplace possible.66 The nature of Internet speech is different than other types of
speech, particularly traditional written speech: the cost of using the Internet is lower
than traditional forms of media, the Internet affords an easy way to speak to a large
audience, and the Internet provides tremendous social networking tools that are helpful
57 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
58 See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
59 See infra Part II.B.
60 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s Contextual
First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 953 (2008).
61 Jerome A. Barron, Access To The Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
62 Netanel, supra note 60, at 953.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Barron, supra note 61, at 1641.
66 See Netanel, supra note 60, at 953.
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in a wide range of areas.67 The openness, low cost and easy access of the Internet are
important issues to consider from a speech protection perspective.
Professor Netanel notes, “Barron cogently argued that the First Amendment re-
quires real, effective, and widespread opportunities for dissident speakers to commu-
nicate their message to an audience, not merely a right to be free from government
censorship.”68 This free and unobstructed communication is one purpose of Internet
speech, including social networking sites. For example, Twitter served as an impor-
tant avenue of communication in the dissident uprising in Iran in 2009.69 In 2011, the
world saw the importance of social networking during the uprising in Egypt and the
subsequent government shutdown of the Internet.70 The openness and ease of Internet
speech, as seen through these examples, demonstrates that this type of speech is vi-
tally important and should be afforded the full protections of the First Amendment.
B. Congress and the Courts’ Laissez-Faire View of Internet Regulation
Congress and the courts appear to agree that Internet speech should be afforded
the same protections as traditional avenues of speech.71 In the short existence of the
Internet, Congress has enacted various statutes on the use of and protections for the
Internet,72 and in doing so has demonstrated that it believes the Internet is best left to
self-regulation, rather than extensive government regulation.73 For example, two pieces
of legislation that have become law—the Communications Decency Act (CDA)74 and
67 See Jillian Bluestone, Comment, La Russa’s Loophole: Trademark Infringement Lawsuits
and Social Networks, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 578 (2010) (examining, for example,
a Federal District Court’s finding that the Internet provides an easy and inexpensive “way for
a speaker to reach a large audience” (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D.
Pa. 1996))).
68 Netanel, supra note 60, at 955.
69 See, e.g., Lev Grossman, Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement, TIME,
June 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html.
70 See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Egypt Restores Internet as Turmoil Escalates, WASH. POST
TECH BLOG, (Feb. 2, 2011, 10:16 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/02
/egypt_restores_internet_report.html (discussing the government’s decision to restore internet
access after a one week blackout); Cecilia Kang & Ian Shapira, Facebook Treads Carefully
After its Vital Role in Egypt’s Anti-Mubarak Protests, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/02/AR2011020206107.html
(discussing Facebook and other social networking sites’ quiet work to empower anti-
Mubarak protesters).
71 See infra notes 72–94 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006) [hereinafter
ACPA]; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 200 (2006) [hereinafter DMCA];
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) [hereinafter CDA].
73 See Bluestone, supra note 67, at 578 (examining the CDA and DMCA).
74 CDA § 230.
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)75—protect Internet service providers
from defamation suits and copyright liability for something a user does through the
providers’ services.76 Social networking sites adapted to the legislation and in doing so
protected themselves from liability.77 Congress stated in the CDA, “It is the policy
of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that pres-
ently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”78 As the
Fourth Circuit noted, “Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose
to freedom of speech . . . [and the CDA] was enacted, in part . . . to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum.”79 The CDA and similar legislation demon-
strate Congress’s intent not to extensively regulate Internet speech.80
This congressional intent is important because it demonstrates an initial distrust
by Congress of government regulation of the Internet.81 Congress’s decision not to
regulate something does not make a regulation unconstitutional, but in the specific
case of protecting Internet service providers from liability, the courts have invoked
constitutional terminology, like “chilling effect.”82 In Zeran v. American Online, the
Fourth Circuit used the phrase “a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech”83
when discussing the implications of placing liability on Internet service providers.84
It is telling that courts, in particular the conservative Fourth Circuit,85 would im-
mediately jump to the language of “chilling effect,”86 since that language is often tied
to the idea of “overbreadth” in First Amendment jurisprudence.87 Although Zeran
was not a First Amendment case, the Fourth Circuit’s use of First Amendment ter-
minology in the context of Internet speech demonstrates courts’ and Congress’s un-
derstanding that this type of regulation, even though it is tort-focused, is really about
upholding the rights of individuals with regards to Internet speech.88
75 DMCA §§ 201–03.
76 See CDA § 230; DMCA §§ 201–02.
77 Bluestone, supra note 67, at 589.
78 CDA § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).
79 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
80 See Bluestone, supra note 67, at 578.
81 See id. (examining CDA, § 230).
82 See id. at 582 (“Therefore, the court determined that creating liability upon notice would
have ‘a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333)).
83 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1999, at A22.
86 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
87 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 945–48; Richard Fallen, Jr., Making
Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 858 (1991) (“[T]he statute . . . was ‘overbroad’ be-
cause it also prohibited constitutionally protected conduct that might be engaged in by others.”).
88 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Congress considered the weight of the speech interests
implicated . . . .”).
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With this understanding, the CDA and similar legislation focus on the protection
of the Internet as an avenue of speech.89 Congress’s policy statement, “It is the po-
licy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation,”90
makes clear that Congress recognizes the importance and the potential for Internet
speech.91 Similarly, the Supreme Court recently wrote that “whatever the challenges
of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’
when a new and different medium for communication appears.”92 Both Congress’s
and the Court’s statements demonstrate the intent and importance of protecting speech,
regardless of the medium.
C. Social Networking as Important Speech
Social networking, blogging and Internet speech may do very little original
reporting,93 but Internet speech provides opportunities for people to play a role in
public discourse, and these possibilities require the First Amendment protection.94
Through its conscious decision to guard against liability-causing regulations of the
Internet, Congress appears to agree that Internet speech should be protected.95
In April 2010, Marvin Austin used Twitter to tell the world about a steak he
ate,96 but that is not to say that at some point Austin would not have taken to Twitter
to advocate for an issue or a candidate. This flexibility and potential demonstrates
how Internet speech allows for a “self-operating marketplace of ideas.”97 Congress’s
own words98 echo Professor Barron’s hope for the First Amendment to protect a
“self-operating marketplace of ideas.”99 Similarly, the Supreme Court recently em-
braced a broad view of the First Amendment when it wrote that “[t]he Free Speech
89 See CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
90 CDA § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).
91 See supra notes 72–92 and accompanying text.
92 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (citing Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)) (explaining the application of First Amendment
jurisprudence to violent video games).
93 See Netanel, supra note 60, at 965.
94 See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (applying the First Amendment to Internet speech). But see Netanel, supra note 60, at
958 (describing his view that Internet speech can run counter to First Amendment goals). It is
important to note that Professor Netanel is not arguing the speech should not be protected but
is arguing that Internet speech somewhat conflicts with First Amendment goals. Id.
95 See CDA § 230.
96 See Giglio, supra note 27.
97 Barron, supra note 61, at 1641.
98 CDA § 230(b)(2); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99 Barron, supra note 61, at 1641; see Netanel, supra note 60, at 955 (describing Professor
Barron’s goals for the First Amendment, including protecting dissenting voices and allowing
those ideas to be communicated to an audience).
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Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long rec-
ognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous
to try.”100 Supporting Professor Barron’s “robust, egalitarian First Amendment”101 is
why Twitter and other social networking speech should be protected.
III. THE RIGHTS OF A COLLEGE ATHLETE
This Part explores the rights guaranteed to college athletes. It starts by examining
the rights that exist in a college setting generally. This Note then focuses on the rights
of college athletes—particularly, whether an athlete gives up substantive constitu-
tional rights in exchange for being a college athlete. Finally, this Part examines how the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine102 could impact what actions a college may take.
A. History of Fundamental Rights in a College Setting
The famed decision of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District103 set down the often quoted statement, “[I]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.”104 For the purposes of this Note, the Court in Tinker made a
very important observation when it said, “[Students] may not be confined to the ex-
pression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled
to freedom of expression of their views.”105
Although Tinker addresses a fundamental rights question in the grade school
context,106 courts have held that college students, at a minimum, have similar sub-
stantive constitutional rights as grade school students.107 The United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire in Morale v. Grigel held that “[a] college
cannot, in this day and age, protect students under the aegis of in loco parentis author-
ity from the rigors of society’s rules and laws, just as it cannot, under the same aegis,
deprive students of their constitutional rights.”108 A university cannot realistically
100 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
101 Netanel, supra note 60, at 953.
102 For the definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see infra note 142.
103 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
104 Id. at 506.
105 Id. at 511.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976); Univ. of Colo. v.
Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
108 Morale, 422 F. Supp. at 997 (citations omitted).
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attempt to protect its students from the realities of the world by banning their voices
from the world.109
It is without argument that colleges and universities can monitor and regulate
illegal speech, unlawful action, and other things that could endanger or disrupt the
college community.110 The Supreme Court ruled that in a college setting, “the power
of the government to prohibit ‘lawless action’ is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature.”111 The Court, however, limited the reach of colleges to “actions which
‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’”112 In
Healy v. James, the Court applied that standard to the right of association113 and
deemed that associational activities could be regulated when “they infringe [on]
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportu-
nity of other students to obtain an education.”114 Undoubtedly, colleges can make
a policy forbidding speech that impacts the educational environment or is illegal,115
but going beyond that by forbidding content or substance is impermissible.116
Although the Supreme Court has not defined free speech rights for college
students,117 it did note in a case regarding faculty speech rights, “Our Nation is deep-
ly committed to safeguarding academic freedom . . . . That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom.”118 The Court continued, “The classroom is pecu-
liarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”119 This statement appears to be, and should be, a
guiding principle for free speech on college campuses.
The lower courts have delved into speech rights with a greater focus on how a
university can regulate student speech.120 One of the most pertinent of those decisions
109 See id. (discussing that a college cannot attempt to take a parental role in protecting
students from the world by not letting students be part of the world).
110 Healy, 408 U.S. at 189 (discussing past precedent and the latitude given to schools to
regulate speech). Also for note, the First Amendment does not include protections for speech
that incites illegal activity, or speech that constitutes fighting words or obscenity. See, e.g.,
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, §§ 11.3.1–11.3.4, at 986–1044.
111 Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
112 Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
113 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the
people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).
114 Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 187.
117 In 2006 the Supreme Court declined to hear Hosty v. Carter, which would have ad-
dressed free speech rights for college students. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006).
118 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Morale v. Grigel,
422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976).
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is Doe v. University of Michigan121 from the Eastern District of Michigan. In Doe,
the University reacted to horrific acts of racism on its campus122 by instituting a policy
that governed speech throughout campus.123 The plaintiff was a psychology graduate
student and his research dealt with potentially controversial theories that could be
viewed as “sexist” or “racist.”124 He argued that the policy—specifically the classroom
policy125—unconstitutionally chilled his discussion of these theories.126 The class-
room policy directly regulated speech that “stigmatize[d] or victimize[d]” persons
based on their “race, ethnicity, religion” or numerous other factors.127 The court found
“that the drafters of th[is] policy intended that speech need only be offensive to be
sanctionable.”128 Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, the Doe court ruled that
“statutes punishing speech or conduct solely on the grounds that they are unseemly
or offensive are unconstitutionally overbroad.”129
Applying Doe, it is clear that the regulation of simply “offensive” material on a
college campus is “unconstitutionally overbroad.”130 Clearly something more is re-
quired for a college or university to regulate speech. The Supreme Court’s principle
from Healy extends colleges’ ability to regulate speech only to those areas that cause
a disruption in the classroom or are illegal.131 What Doe and Healy represent for the
typical college student is that colleges cannot regulate speech or conduct based on
content, unless it harms the classroom or is in some way illegal.132 To do so either
means that the college’s regulation is overbroad per Doe133 or goes beyond the bound-
aries set in Healy.134 These principles provide parameters for what speech a college
can regulate as far as the general student body, but the question that remains is whether
the rights of a college athlete are different than those of a normal college student.
121 721 F. Supp. 852.
122 Id. at 854 (“[U]nknown persons distributed a flier declaring ‘open season’ on blacks . . . .
[A] student disc jockey at an on-campus radio station allowed racist jokes to be broadcast.
At a demonstration protesting these incidents, a Ku Klux Klan uniform was displayed from
a dormitory window.”).
123 Id. at 856.
124 Id. at 858.
125 The University created three tiers of regulations within the policy. See id. at 856.
Within the “education and academic centers” individuals were subject to discipline for “[a]ny
behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that . . . [c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or de-
meaning environment . . . .” Id.
126 Id. at 858–59.
127 Id. at 856.
128 Id. at 860.
129 Id. at 864.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
132 See id.; Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
133 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
134 Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
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B. The Constitutional Rights of a College Athlete
Although student athletes receive opportunities not available to the general
student body, they also make sacrifices.135 Within college sports, it is believed that
players sometimes have to give up their voices for the privilege of being on a college
team.136 Boise State Football Coach Chris Petersen best summed up the coaches’
perspective on the reality of being a college football player when he said, “We tell
them long before they come here, there’s a price to play on the blue turf. You’re not a
normal person, you’re not a normal college student . . . . There are a lot of things you
can’t do that those normal people get to do.”137 Petersen’s statement reflects a reality
that Boise State player Jeron Johnson agreed with when he said, “You sacrifice a lot,
but it’s all for the better . . . So far every sacrifice I’ve made has been worth it.”138
College athletes make tremendous sacrifices, and for those sacrifices they receive
opportunities the normal college student does not.139 But this belief that a college ath-
lete must give up rights in order to be a college athlete may not comport with the con-
stitutional guarantees afforded to a person, even if that person is also a college athlete.
This Part delves into two issues: first, the fundamental rights a college athlete
possesses, and second, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine140 and its effect on what
sacrifices a college athlete can be forced to make. In the following two subsections,
this Note identifies three lines of reasoning that could be applied by the courts in a
potential college athlete–First Amendment case. The first two come from state su-
preme courts in student athlete drug testing cases, and the final idea treats college
athletes as government employees.
1. Dueling State Supreme Courts’ Positions on Suspicionless Drug Tests
One analogous situation to college athletes’ free speech rights is the fundamental
rights of student athletes when dealing with suspicionless drug tests.141 Similar to a
First Amendment case, drug test cases also deal with a fundamental constitutional right:
135 See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
136 See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
137 Murphy, supra note 35. Famously, Boise State football is known for its blue turf. Boise
State is home to the only blue Astroturf football field in the world. BRONCOSPORTS.COM,
http://www.broncosports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=9900&ATCLID=530470
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
138 Murphy, supra note 35.
139 See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
140 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally holds that the government cannot re-
quire a person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for governmental benefits. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2.4.4, at 980; Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1415.
141 See Autumn K. Leslie, Note & Comment, Online Social Networks and Restrictions on
College Athletes: Student Censorship?, 5 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19,
25–26 (2008).
634 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:619
privacy.142 The issue of drug testing presents two diametrically opposed holdings from
courts as to whether college athletes, because they are in fact college athletes, give
up some level of their substantive constitutional rights.143
In University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, the Colorado Supreme Court took the
position that college athletes are just like other college students and do not give up
their substantive constitutional rights.144 The case was a class-action suit brought by
various student athletes, who objected to mandated, suspicionless drug tests.145 The
university argued that because student athletes “submit to extensive regulation of
their on- and off-campus behavior,” the athletes’ expectations of privacy were
diminished.146 The court rejected this argument, in part, because it concluded the types
of regulations on the student athletes did not include a reduction in the athletes’
Fourth Amendment rights.147
Most importantly, in adopting a line of cases starting with Morale v. Grigel,148
the court in Derdeyn equated college athletes’ rights to those of college students, and
held that college students do not hold fewer constitutional rights just because they
are college students.149 As the court analyzed this case under the constitutional pro-
tections for a college student, it follows that the court decided student athletes have
substantially the same rights as college students.150 Therefore, if a college student does
not forgo a right, neither does a college athlete.
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court took the opposite view and
found that college athletes do forgo some substantive rights.151 In Hill v. NCAA, the
court held that student athletes were different from the general student body.152 The
court found that because of the sacrifices athletes make, they have “diminished ex-
pectations of privacy,” and student athletes exchange the right to full privacy for the
benefits of being a student athlete.153 The Hill court focused on a number of intrusions
into a college athlete’s life to demonstrate the diminished right to privacy.154 For
142 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 10.1.1, at 792 (discussing those rights the Supreme
Court has deemed “fundamental rights”).
143 See infra text accompanying notes 144–65.
144 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
145 Id. at 932–33.
146 Id. at 940.
147 Id. at 935, 941.
148 422 F. Supp 988 (D.N.H. 1976).
149 Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 938.
150 See id.
151 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
152 Id. at 637.
153 Id. (“Unlike the general population, student athletes undergo frequent physical
examinations, reveal their bodily and medical conditions to coaches and trainers, and often
dress and undress in same-sex locker rooms. In so doing, they normally and reasonably forgo
a measure of their privacy in exchange for the personal and professional benefits of
extracurricular athletics.”).
154 Id.
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example, the fact that college athletes submit to physical examinations, physical
therapy, preventive trainer care, and are often subject to group showering, were all
reasons the Hill court held that an athlete had a diminished right to privacy.155 It
followed that a drug test was no more invasive than the activities listed above.156 The
California Supreme Court concluded, without directly saying it, that a person can
be required to accept diminished constitutional rights in exchange for being part of
a college team.157 The California Supreme Court’s principle for the purpose of this
Note is clear: college athletes forgo some substantive constitutional rights because
they are college athletes.158
The issue of a student athlete’s First Amendment rights has not been taken up
by courts,159 but the opposing views of the Colorado and California Supreme Courts
on the issue of student athletes’ Fourth Amendment rights provide some insight into
how courts may approach the issue, as both privacy and speech are fundamental
rights.160 Courts could treat athletes like general college students.161 In that situation,
courts would likely look to Healy, and possibly Doe, to establish what rights a stu-
dent athlete possesses.162 On the other hand, courts could treat athletes differently than
the general student body and hold that athletes possess a diminished speech right.163
2. College Athletes as Public Employees
Another theory for examining the speech rights of a college athlete is to look
at the athlete as a government employee. It has been argued that college athletes
155 Id. at 658.
156 Id. at 658–59.
157 See id. at 659 (“[A]n athlete who refuses consent to drug testing is disqualified from
NCAA competition. But this consequence does not render the athlete’s consent to testing
involuntary in any meaningful legal sense.”). It is important to note that the court was not
addressing a federal constitutional question, but instead it was addressing a state constitution
that applies the right to privacy to freedom from action by a private entity. Id. at 641–42.
158 Id. at 659.
159 Leslie, supra note 141, at 35.
160 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 10.1.1, at 792 (discussing the similarities of fun-
damental rights). To note, similar to the court in Hill, Autumn Leslie argues that college
athletes do give up some First Amendment protections because they are voluntarily part of the
team. Leslie, supra note 141, at 36. This argument rests on the idea that it is the voluntary
membership that erases the right. Id. at 36–37. This could be another line of reasoning used
by the courts, but at this point the courts have not adopted such a line of reasoning. Id. (citing
the potential for the court to adopt this theory). Since the courts have not utilized this line of
reasoning, this Note does not discuss it in more detail.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 146–52.
162 See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the rights of a college student).
163 See Hill, 865 P.2d at 659 (applying that logic to student athlete drug tests).
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should be paid in addition to his or her scholarship and, therefore, treated like a
college’s employees.164
The courts have held that in order to be afforded the protection of the First
Amendment, a public employee’s speech must be on “a ‘matter of public concern’
because it is only this type of speech that is at the core of the First Amendment’s
protections.”165 In Connick v. Myers,166 the Supreme Court held that matters of purely
private concern were not protected by the First Amendment in public employee
cases.167 In examining two public employee blogging cases—City of San Diego v.
Roe168 and Richerson v. Beckon169—Professor Paul Secunda concluded that, because
personal blog posts are typically considered to be of a personal nature and not of
public concern, it is very difficult for public employees to get First Amendment pro-
tections for their blogs.170
Some scholars, most notably Robert Bork, echo the idea that political speech is
the only speech at the “core of the First Amendment[’s protection]” and therefore
argue it is the only speech protected by the First Amendment in general.171 The Bork
idea of only protecting political speech is analogous to the idea of only protecting
speech on “matter[s] of public concern.”172
What the public employee blogging cases and Bork’s similar view demonstrate
is a line of reasoning that limits the First Amendment to political speech or “matters
of public concern.”173 If courts decide to apply a Myers, or Bork-like, rule to college
athletes’ speech cases, they will clearly find that colleges can restrict personal Internet
164 See, e.g., Rod Gilmore, College Football Players Deserve Pay for Play, ESPN.COM
(Jan. 17, 2007, 2:59 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=gilmore
_rod&id=2733624.
165 See Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) Employed: Some First Amendment
Implications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 679, 688 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence with cases like Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
166 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
167 Id. at 147 (“We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest
. . . a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”).
168 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
169 No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2008), aff’d, 337 F.
App’x 637 (9th Cir. 2009).
170 Secunda, supra note 165, at 691.
171 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971). Bork notes that the protection of non-political speech relies on the
“enlightenment of society and its elected representatives.” Id. at 28. This echoes the words of
Professor Secunda in that for public employees the First Amendment only protects speech as
“a ‘matter of public concern’ because it is only this type of speech that is at the core of the
First Amendment’s protections.” Secunda, supra note 165, at 688.
172 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
173 Id.
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speech, unless the speech is political or on a matter of public concern.174 As Professor
Secunda noted, personal social networking often does not deal with issues of public
importance, and therefore fails to be a “matter of public concern.”175
But the public employee application176 and the Bork view177 are unlikely to prevail.
Although the status of college athletes has been hotly debated,178 they are not public
employees, even if the athlete receives a scholarship.179 Further, as discussed, some
courts equate the rights of college athletes with the substantive rights of regular college
students,180 and to separate out student athletes means that they will not be treated like
other students. Finally, the Supreme Court has not subscribed to the Bork view.181
From a policy standpoint, the reasoning presented by both the Bork view182 and
the public employee speech cases183 would be a poor choice for the courts. These
models abandon the recognition that college athletes are also college students.184
Also, some athletes receive scholarships and some do not.185 If the courts decided
to treat athletes as employees and equated a scholarship to the compensation an em-
ployee receives, then only some athletes would qualify as “employees” because only
some athletes receive compensation in terms of a scholarship.186 If that were the
case, the restrictions would only apply to those athletes receiving compensation in
the form of a scholarship. This creates two classes of rights within the population
of college athletes. Finally, tying employment law to college athletics could open
174 See id.; see also Bork, supra note 171, at 29.
175 Secunda, supra note 165, at 688.
176 See supra notes 165–77 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 180–89 and
accompanying text.
177 See Bork, supra note 171.
178 Compare, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 164, with Jason Whitlock, College Athletes Already
Paid in Full, ESPN.com (Jan. 17, 2007), http://espn.go.com/page2/s/whitlock/020919.html.
179 See, e.g., Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 273–74 (1994) (discussing the current model of college
athletics and how the players are unpaid amateurs).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 146–52 (discussing the Colorado Supreme Court
decision in Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993)).
181 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 926; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on
public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from
entertainment, and dangerous to try.”).
182 Bork, supra note 171.
183 See supra notes 165–78 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 146–65 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., U.S. District Court Rules NCAA Policy Governing Scholarship Limit Should
Go to Trial, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us
-district-court-rules-ncaa-policy-governing-scholarship-limit-should-go-to-trial-55013257.html
(discussing non-scholarship football players’ suit against the NCAA for limiting the number
of scholarships).
186 Id.
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a floodgate to additional policy and legal issues, specifically in terms of labor law
and taxation issues.187
3. How Best to Secure College Athletes’ Substantive Rights
From this Note’s perspective, the Derdeyn view is preferred. The Derdeyn
court’s view places college students and college athletes on the same level as far as
constitutional rights are concerned.188 The other approaches treat athletes differently
than students.189 Clearly, there are times when athletes are not the same as non-athlete
students, but saying that the Constitution treats athletes differently than students
goes too far.
These divergent theories unveil an important question: Can universities use a
scholarship or membership on the team as leverage to deprive an athlete of a funda-
mental right? If there is a substantive constitutional right at stake, then under the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine,190 strict scrutiny may not allow for such leverage.191
C. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Protects College Athletes
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine192 holds that the “government may not
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.”193 Neither the
Supreme Court in general unconstitutional conditions cases,194 nor the lower courts
in cases of student athletes’ fundamental rights and unconstitutional conditions,195
have applied this doctrine uniformly. What is important about the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is that if there is an unconstitutional condition, strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard.196 If strict scrutiny applies, then the court recognizes that for
187 See Davis, supra note 179, at 323–24 (discussing the labor and tax law implications
of making college athletes employees).
188 See Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 938 (Colo. 1993).
189 See text accompanying notes 153–60.
190 See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 948 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a college
drug testing case); see also supra note 140 (defining unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
191 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671 (discussing the requirements of strict
scrutiny).
192 For the definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine see supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
193 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (quoting
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
194 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1415; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2.4.4, at 981
(discussing the Court’s decision in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364 (1984)).
195 Compare Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 948–50, with Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 659
(Cal. 1994).
196 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1506.
2011] ALL A TWITTER 639
a college to abridge a student athlete’s right to speak, the court must find a “compelling
government purpose” for regulating the speech.197
1. The Three Approaches
The literature on the unconditional conditions doctrine presents three main tests
for whether an unconstitutional condition exists.198
The traditional view of the courts was derived by Professor Kathleen Sullivan
from a number of cases.199 Under this view, an unconstitutional condition exists when
there is a “benefit[ ] that government is permitted but not compelled to provide,”200
and government coercion impacts “some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by
the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech . . . .”201 Courts typically find
constitutional problems with these conditions “when they ‘pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.’”202
The second test for an unconstitutional condition is Professor Sullivan’s own
development and is rather straightforward.203 Simply put, the “test would subject to
strict review any government benefit condition whose primary purpose or effect is
to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional
liberty in a direction favored by government.”204
The third view comes from Sally Lynn Meloch.205 She theorizes that courts
ask only one question before moving to strict scrutiny: whether there is a punish-
ment involved.206
No matter which of the three tests is applied, there is clearly an unconstitutional
condition present in the case of monitoring student athletes’ use of social networking
tools and regulating their speech. Under the courts’ traditional view,207 the benefit
offered by the government is a scholarship, which the government is not required to
197 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671.
198 See infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text.
199 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1422.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1426. This approach will be referenced as the “traditional” approach by the courts.
202 Id. at 1428 (citations omitted).
203 See id. at 1499–1500.
204 Id.
205 Sally Lynn Meloch, Note, An Analysis of Public College Athlete Drug Test Programs
Through the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 815, 819 (1987).
206 Id. at 834–35 (discussing the Supreme Court’s distinction between cases like
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), particularly how criminal defendants cannot be punished for exercising their right to
appeal, but that there is no punishment if the defendant refuses a plea deal and is sentenced
to a higher amount).
207 See supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text.
640 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:619
give.208 The government is using the scholarship or membership on a team to coerce the
athlete into curbing his or her voice. Similarly, under Professor Sullivan’s standard,209
the government is conditioning athletic scholarships on athletes giving up their rights
to free speech or, in UNC’s case, submitting to monitoring.210 As Professor Sullivan
puts it, the “primary . . . effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise
of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government,”211 and, in
this case, that preferred governmental direction is for the athletes to give up their free
speech rights. Finally, using Meloch’s test, there is a penalty for an athlete not giving
up his or her speech right: the potential loss of a scholarship.212
This Part demonstrates that if a college athlete has a fundamental right to speak,
a college cannot use a scholarship or membership on a team as leverage to make a
player speak in the “direction favored by government.”213 As the Supreme Court said
in Tinker, “[Students] may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that
are officially approved.”214 In the situation of college sports and social networking,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should protect athletes from schools re-
stricting the athletes’ speech to what is approved or condoned. If a school is using a
scholarship as leverage to get the athlete to give up a fundamental right, such as
speech, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine215 should apply and require that a
school satisfy the strict scrutiny test of requiring regulations to be “necessary to
achieve a compelling [governmental] purpose.”216
IV. THE POLICIES
After establishing that college athletes do have fundamental rights, this Note turns
to the question of whether the method of restriction is constitutional. As discussed in
the Introduction, the relationship between state universities and the NCAA compli-
cates how colleges can address student athletes’ constitutional rights.217 As a private
entity, the NCAA can suspend players that violate its rules, even if the player was
exercising his or her constitutional rights.218 UNC’s reaction to this problem by
208 See, e.g., U.S. District Court Rules NCAA Policy Governing Scholarship Limit Should
Go to Trial, supra note 187 (discussing non-scholarship football players’ suit against the
NCAA for limiting the number of scholarships); supra note 192.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 203–06.
210 See infra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (discussing the tweets and subsequent
punishment of two football players).
211 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1499–1500.
212 Meloch, supra note 205, at 849.
213 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1499–1500.
214 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
215 See supra note 140.
216 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671.
217 See supra Introduction.
218 See supra notes 6–8, 30–32 and accompanying text.
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monitoring social networking speech is not surprising. If the university can keep its
players from using social networking to break the NCAA’s rules, it follows that the
players can remain eligible for competition.
This Part compares the competing policies of Boise State219 and UNC220 through
the lens of traditional First Amendment doctrine. This Note looks at both policies in
terms of whether they are content-based or content-neutral and examines other free
speech issues that impact each policy.
A. UNC’s Monitoring Policy
The first major area to examine for either policy is whether the policy is content-
based221 or content-neutral.222 The Supreme Court wrote, “‘[A]s a general matter . . .
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content,’ [but] [t]here are of course exceptions.”223 This
determination of whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral, along
with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,224 will determine whether strict
scrutiny is appropriate.
The Supreme Court has held that laws or regulations that are content-based225
are subject to strict scrutiny,226 but that content-neutral standards227 are viewed under
an intermediate level of scrutiny.228 The Court has gone so far as to decide that
“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”229
219 See supra notes 13, 35.
220 See supra text accompanying note 43.
221 Content-based laws are ones that are either not “viewpoint neutral” or are not “subject
matter neutral.”CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2, at 934. Viewpoint neutral requires the
law not regulate the “ideology of the message,” and subject matter neutral requires that laws
not regulate the “topic of the speech.” Id.
222 Id. § 11.2.4.4, at 932 (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content.”) (quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95–96 (1972)). But see supra note 221 (discussing the elements of a content-based law).
223 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)) (citations omitted).
224 See supra note 140.
225 See supra note 221.
226 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2.4.4, at 981 (discussing the Court’s decisions in
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 539 U.S. 803 (2000) and R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 641 (1992)).
227 See supra note 222.
228 Intermediate scrutiny is defined generally as “a law is upheld if it is substantially related
to an important government purpose.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671 (citing Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983) and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
229 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
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Whether the UNC policy requiring coaches or administrators to monitor student
athletes’ social networking230 is content-neutral is a difficult question. In two of the
seminal cases on the issue, the challenged law, regulation, or rule focused on a sin-
gular type of speech. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc.,231 the law only restricted the viewing of adult entertainment.232 Similarly, in
Ashcroft v. ACLU,233 the law in question regulated only websites of a sexual nature.234
Both of these cases dealt with a law that explicitly or implicitly regulated only one
type of expression or speech, providing a clear line of non-neutrality.
The UNC policy235 is not as clear-cut as these examples, but it nevertheless falls
into the category of a content-based regulation. The policy aims to regulate speech
that “violates the law or NCAA, University or athletic department policies . . . .”236
Through those words, it appears to only regulate speech that violates prescribed rules.237
But it is the results of the policy, not its goals, that demonstrate that the policy is
content-based. For example, UNC football player Devon Ramsey was suspended
after he tweeted, “My whole team gettin [sic] money I just call it gang green . . . .”238
Also under the policy, Quinton Coples of the UNC football team was asked to take
down a tweet that was homophobic.239 Neither of these tweets was clearly illegal,
although both were offensive. These examples demonstrate that the UNC policy
targets specific content that the school finds offensive, going beyond speech that
purely disrupts the school.240 This policing of only what the school finds offensive
regulates the “topic of the speech” and should be considered content-based.241
Based on the use of an unconstitutional condition242 and content-based restriction,243
it follows that the UNC speech monitoring policy would be subject to strict scrutiny.244
230 See supra text accompanying note 43.
231 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
232 Id.
233 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
234 Id. at 659 (describing the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2010)).
235 See supra text accompanying note 43.
236 See supra note 42.
237 See supra text accompanying note 43.
238 Megan Walsh, Twitter Banned for UNC Football, THE DAILY TAR HEEL (Oct. 18,
2010), http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2010/10/twitter_banned_for_unc_football.
It is important to note that Coach Butch Davis alluded to other issues with Ramsey that may
have contributed to this suspension. Id.
239 Brett Friedlander, Tweet, Tweet . . . UNC Players Just Don’t Seem to Learn,
STARNEWSONLINE (Oct. 15, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://acc.blogs.starnewsonline.com/16813
/tweet-tweet-unc-players-just-don’t-seem-to-learn/. The tweet included the words “stop the
gayness.” Id.
240 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
241 See supra note 221.
242 See supra note 140 and Part III.C (arguing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
applies in this situation).
243 See supra note 221 and Part IV.A (arguing the rule is content-based).
244 See supra notes 192–200, 225–31 and accompanying text.
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This finding is supported by the Derdeyn court’s use of strict scrutiny in deciding
an analogous suspicionless drug test case.245
1. Strict Scrutiny and College Athletics
The strict scrutiny standard requires that the regulation be “necessary to achieve
a compelling government purpose.”246 It is argued that strict scrutiny almost always
guarantees that the law in question will fail constitutional muster.247 This should be
the case for policies of college athletic departments. The goals of an athletic depart-
ment are limited.
In Derdeyn, the goals cited by the athletic department for suspicionless drug testing
were the health and safety of the players and the college community in general.248
In the context of drug tests, these reasons were deemed not to be compelling.249
An athletic department in a First Amendment case could attempt to cite health and
safety as goals, but if these reasons are not compelling for drug testing, these reasons
will not constitute compelling reasons for First Amendment cases. The athletic
department could also argue the reason for the policy is the protection of students
from their own immaturity,250 but that also fails to rise to the level of a compelling
governmental interest.251
Even if the school cites one of the aforementioned interests, the real reasons for
UNC’s policy are competitiveness and the ability to keep a team on the field.252 UNC
is a great example of this problem because the inappropriate use of Twitter resulted
in thirteen players being ineligible to play in the football team’s opening game.253
Competitiveness should not be considered a compelling interest. It does not rise
to the level of importance of other governmental reasons already found not to reach
the threshold of compelling government interest.254 If the health and safety of college
athletes or the campus community are not compelling interests, then the college’s
245 Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 938 (Colo. 1993).
246 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671.
247 See id.
248 See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 945.
249 See id. (describing the interest of protecting the health and safety of the student athletes
and the student body as “unquestionably significant,” but holding that it failed to pass the
strict scrutiny requirements).
250 See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 (D.N.H. 1976) (arguing that colleges
cannot attempt to protect their students by invoking the term in loco parentis).
251 Id. (discussing why in loco parentis is not a sufficient justification).
252 See Barnes, supra note 31 (discussing UNC’s inability to field players because of po-
tential NCAA violations).
253 See id.
254 Other reasons include health and safety of the college athletes and community, Derdeyn,
863 P.2d at 945, and a school protecting its students and the college community, Morale, 422
F. Supp. at 997.
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ability to field a football team cannot be compelling.255 Without a “compelling gov-
ernment purpose,” the policy must fail strict scrutiny.256
2. UNC’s Policy Violates the Void for Vagueness Doctrine
In addition to the issue of content-based regulation, the outcomes of UNC’s mon-
itoring policy in action are eerily similar to the worries expressed by the court in
Doe v. University of Michigan.257 In Doe, the district court held that the University’s
policy regarding speech258 only required that speech be offensive to be punishable.259
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,260 the court’s opinion
noted that “[a] statute is unconstitutionally vague when ‘men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning,’”261 and held that the University’s policy was
unconstitutionally vague.262
The void for vagueness doctrine, in the Supreme Court’s words, means that reg-
ulations or statutes must have “sufficient definiteness [so] that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and [be of] a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”263 On its face, the UNC policy might seem
to provide some level of definiteness by stating that the school will be monitoring
for speech that violates the law, NCAA or University policy.264 But the UNC policy
fails the Court’s rule because speech monitoring “encourage[s] arbitrary and discrim-
inatory enforcement.”265 The policy requires that a university official, either a coach
or an administrator, survey players’ social networking sites and decide if something
a player says violates the law, or NCAA or university regulations.266 There are no clear
guidelines for uniform application. Players clearly know where the policy starts—with
speech that violates state or federal law267—but the limits of the policy are unclear.
As applied with Quinton Coples’s and Devon Ramsey’s tweets,268 the policy in action
255 See, e.g., Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 945 (“[A]lthough the integrity of its athletic program is,
like all the other interests asserted by CU, a valid and commendable one, it does not seem to
be very significant for Fourth Amendment purposes.”).
256 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671.
257 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
258 Id. at 856 (describing the University’s policy).
259 Id. at 860.
260 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973).
261 Doe, 721 F. Supp. 866 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607).
262 Id. at 866–67.
263 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
264 See supra text accompanying note 43.
265 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
266 See supra text accompanying note 43.
267 See supra text accompanying note 43.
268 See supra notes 238–42.
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not only regulates illegal speech, but it also includes types of offensive speech.269
The question then becomes: What is “offensive?”
The Doe court, which held that purely offensive speech does not fall into the
category of what a college could regulate, found that “[s]tudents of common under-
standing were necessarily forced to guess at whether a comment about a controversial
issue would later be found to be sanctionable under the Policy.”270 Similar to the Doe
case, student athletes under this policy can only guess at what officials monitoring the
athletes’ social networking will find offensive. Clearly, per the Coples tweet, the
policy includes homophobic tweets,271 but what else would the UNC monitors find
offensive? This demonstrates how the policy is vague and promotes “arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”272
The issues with the UNC monitoring policy are clear. It is content-based, as seen
in its application, and it is vague because it lacks clarity and promotes arbitrary
enforcement.
B. Boise State’s Policy
Although both the UNC policy273 and the Boise State approach274 implicate
players’ substantive rights of speech, they do so in very different ways.275 Those
differences lead to very different constitutional outcomes. From the standpoint of
content neutrality, it is clear that Boise State’s policy276 banning the use of Twitter
for a period of time is a content-neutral regulation.277 It blocks all speech conducted
through the medium of social networking and does not focus on the content of
speech. Further, the policy does not stem from the government agent—in this case
Coach Chris Petersen—attempting to regulate any specific content, but instead its
purpose is to stop the distractions that Twitter caused for his team.278
The Boise State policy of a season-long Twitter ban does not require that a
player restrict his or her speech to certain topics; it allows an athlete to say whatever
he or she wants, just not on Twitter.279 This does not have the same effect on speech
as the UNC policy280 because the player need not be afraid of repercussions based
269 See supra text accompanying notes 238–42.
270 Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
271 See Friedlander, supra note 239. The tweet included the words “stop the gayness.” Id.
272 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
273 See supra text accompanying note 43.
274 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
275 See supra Part III.
276 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
277 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1, at 671 (explaining the definition of content-neutral).
278 See Murphy, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
280 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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on the content of that speech. A ban on Twitter does not restrict the speech, only the
method.281 This demonstrates that Boise State’s approach is content-neutral, and
therefore it is not subject to strict scrutiny on those grounds.282
The fact that Boise State’s policy283 is content-neutral demonstrates why Boise
State’s ban284 is less likely to stir a constitutional challenge than the speech-monitoring
policy of UNC,285 but the limited nature of the regulation further demonstrates why
Boise State’s method is preferable.
This restriction acts only as a “time, place and manner restriction,”286 and based on
past precedent, such restrictions can be constitutional.287 As the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,288 “a regulation of the time, place, or manner
of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests . . . .”289 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized
that “time, place, or manner” restrictions can be appropriate on college campuses.290
Under the Supreme Court’s rule in Ward,291 because the college’s interest is
content-neutral,292 the remaining questions are whether the restriction is “narrowly
tailored” and whether the government’s interest is “legitimate.”293 Coach Petersen
did narrowly tailor his rule to one type of communication that was problematic:
Twitter.294 His ban on tweeting only impacted the one medium that was a distraction
and he tailored his rule to just that problem. The interest he was serving was avoiding
distractions on his team. Whether that interest is “legitimate” could be debated, but
this standard is clearly more deferential than strict scrutiny,295 and therefore it has
a greater chance of passing constitutional muster.
What is important is that Coach Petersen tailored his rule so that it fit his pro-
gram’s need of ending the Twitter distraction, and also did not unreasonably interfere
with the constitutional rights of his players. In doing so, based on the fact that his
281 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
282 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also supra notes 221–32
and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
284 See id.
285 See supra text accompanying note 43.
286 This idea is taken from public forum doctrine and deals with whether government can
restrict speech in certain public areas like parks, streets, and around school property. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.4.2.1, at 1124–25.
287 See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17,
§ 11.4.2.2, at 1131.
288 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
289 Id. at 798.
290 Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
291 491 U.S. at 782.
292 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 11.2.1, at 932.
293 Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
294 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
295 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 6.5, at 540–41.
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policy is content-neutral and is only a “time, place, [or] manner restriction[ ],”296 it
appears that Coach Petersen devised a method that at least does not have to stand up
to strict scrutiny.297 It provides further evidence that from a constitutional perspective,
the outright but limited ban of Boise State298 is preferable to UNC’s policy299 of
speech monitoring.300
Ironically, a total ban on a certain type of medium or social networking fits into
Professor Barron’s, and this Note’s, view of a “robust, egalitarian First Amendment.”301
The ban is limited and regulates the method of speaking, but not the speech itself.302
Professor Barron argued for a “First Amendment [that] requires real, effective, and
widespread opportunities for dissident speakers to communicate their message to an
audience . . . .”303 A dissenting voice can still have a place when a narrow group of
people, in this case a football team, is limited in the mediums they can use to speak.
There is no fear that the player might say something that will cause him to lose his
scholarship or be kicked off the team.304
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
Social networking issues on a college campus are not restricted just to college
athletic departments. Cyberbullying has become a major topic on college campuses.305
At its worst, it is the story of the student who committed suicide after his roommate
and his roommate’s girlfriend posted a sex video of the student online.306 Geoff
Mulvihill and Samantha Henry raise the important point that tragedy and others
“illustrate[ ] yet again the Internet’s alarming potential as a means of tormenting
others and raises questions whether young people in the age of Twitter and Facebook
can even distinguish public from private.”307 What this demonstrates for the purposes
of this Note is that there are times when schools and colleges may need a framework
for implementing potential social networking restrictions. The Supreme Court and
296 See id. § 11.4.2.2, at 1131.
297 See id. § 9.1, at 671.
298 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
299 See supra text accompanying note 43.
300 See supra Part IV.A.
301 See Netanel, supra note 60, at 953.
302 See supra note 43 and text accompanying note 279.
303 See Netanel, supra note 60, at 955.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 9–10 (explaining that violations of the UNC policy
could result in dismissal from the team).
305 See, e.g., Jill Laster, 2 Scholars Examine Cyberbullying Among College Students,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (June 6, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/article -
content/65766/.
306 See, e.g., Geoff Mulvihill & Samantha Henry, NJ Student’s Suicide Illustrates Internet
Dangers, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/10/01/AR2010100102515_pf.html.
307 Id.
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lower courts, as discussed throughout this Note, have provided some degree of assis-
tance to schools regarding what is constitutional.308
Colleges and universities, in both the general setting and in particular the ath-
letic setting, need to recognize that free speech rights on a college campus are sub-
stantially the same as free speech rights among the general public.309 If colleges
focus on content,310 like UNC does,311 they will continue to face the courts’ insur-
mountable hurdle of strict scrutiny.312
But colleges and universities have alternatives that do not have to satisfy strict
scrutiny. The first is the focus of Healy v. James.313 Under that framework, colleges
would focus on regulating speech that “infringe[s] [on] reasonable campus rules,
interrupt[s] classes, or substantially interfere[s] with the opportunity of other students
to obtain an education.”314
The second approach is to take a page from Boise State Football Coach Chris
Petersen’s playbook.315 A college program could place a limited restriction on the
mode of communication.316 This avoids a content-neutral/content-based debate, and
focuses on whether the school has “legitimate” goals and has narrowly tailored its re-
strictions to meet those goals.317 This also avoids the evils of speech monitoring dis-
cussed in this Note, such as vagueness.318 Instead, such a policy is a simple way to take
care of a distraction.319 It may not be perfect, but it avoids strict scrutiny, which, at
a minimum, means that the policy is not presumably dead on arrival at the courts.320
Colleges and Internet speech have great potential to further the idea of a “robust,
egalitarian First Amendment,”321 but the continued growth of Internet speech, along
308 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976); Univ. of
Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
309 See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Morale, 422 F. Supp. at 997 (arguing that colleges cannot
attempt to protect its students by invoking the term in loco parentis).
310 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 860.
311 See supra text accompanying note 43.
312 See, e.g., Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929; see also supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
313 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
314 Id. at 189.
315 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
317 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (defining intermediate
scrutiny).
318 See supra Part IV.A.2.
319 See supra notes 13, 35 and accompanying text.
320 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 9.1.2, at 671 (citing Gerald Gunter, Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
321 Netanel, supra note 60, at 953.
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with social networking, presents dangers.322 Colleges should focus on narrowly tailor-
ing their solutions to the real problem.
One final note for those concerned with the impact of such policies on teams’
competitiveness. Although it is only a correlation, UNC, with its content-based policy
of vagueness and distrust, completed the 2010–2011 football season with eight wins
and five losses and finished third in the Atlantic Coast Conference Coastal Division.323
Boise State, with its content-neutral policy, finished the year with twelve wins and
one loss, in turn winning a share of the Western Athletic Conference.324 It might be
only a coincidence, but nonetheless is something to keep in mind.
CONCLUSION
This inquiry started with two policies created to deal with the rising issue of
social networking, UNC’s speech monitoring program325 and Boise State’s season-
long ban on Twitter.326 These solutions aimed to fix problems arising from student
athletes who used social networking as a speech outlet.
But the fact that these were student athletes using social networking should not
change the constitutional protections of the First Amendment. Social networking
and Internet speech should be protected by the First Amendment in the same way
that traditional avenues of speech are protected. The Internet has the potential to be
the “self-operating marketplace of ideas” that Professor Barron envisioned.327
Additionally, the substantive constitutional rights of the student athlete should be
no different than the constitutional rights of a student. In recognizing that student
athletes have these protected rights, colleges and universities should be subject to
strict scrutiny328 if they attempt to use a scholarship or membership on a team as
leverage to get the student athlete to conform to the schools’ wishes, because such
acts violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.329
Finally, the two policies could not be more different from a constitutional
standpoint. UNC chose a policy that focuses on content and is arbitrarily enforced.330
Boise State’s policy curbs only the method of speech, not the content.331 UNC’s
322 See, e.g., supra notes 305–11 and accompanying text.
323 See Atlantic Coast Conference Standings—2010, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/ncf
/conferences/standings?confID=1&year=2010 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
324 See Western Athletic Conference Standings—2010, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/ncf
/conferences/standings?confId=16&year=2010 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
325 See supra text accompanying note 43.
326 See supra notes 13 & 35 and accompanying text.
327 Barron, supra note 61, at 1641.
328 See supra note 17.
329 See supra note 140 and Part III.C.
330 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
331 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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approach should be avoided by schools as it potentially subjects the school to the
rigors of strict scrutiny.332 On the other hand, Boise State’s policy appears to avoid strict
scrutiny and be narrowly limited to fix the problem it aimed to fix: the distraction
of Twitter to players.333 Twitter and other social networking avenues may present
challenges to colleges and universities, but, as discussed in this Note, there are
constitutional ways for the college community to limit the distraction and still
embrace the medium.
332 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
333 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
